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4. Future Warfare and China 
Nan Li 
 
China has so far exhibited a mix of policy behavior more or less associated with the four different 
future security scenarios specified in Tomorrow’s Security Challenges: fragmented international system, 
concert of powers, return of great power confrontations, and rise of non-state networks. This essay 
fleshes out the Chinese policy behavior associated with each of these four scenarios, together with a 
brief discussion of factors/variables that may affect changes in this behavior, which may also 
indicate which scenario is likely to dominate Chinese policy behavior in the future.  
 
Fragmented international system and Chinese behavior 
In comparison with Europe, where regional integration is taking shape, or with Africa, where states 
are either weak or failing, East Asia is characterized by strong, autonomous states that guide both 
domestic development and foreign policies, which are further reinforced by strong national identities 
and inter-state mistrust associated with historical legacies. Chinese policy behavior is both a response 
to and a perpetuator of such conditions of a fragmented international system where inter-state policy 
coordination remains difficult. China, for instance, is faced with the issue of reunification with 
Taiwan and has unresolved land and maritime territorial disputes with many of its neighbors; the 
central mission of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 1985 is to be prepared for fighting and 
winning “local war” regarding territorial disputes on the margins of China as well as reunification 
with Taiwan.  
Whether these disputes may be resolved peacefully or escalate to military conflicts in the future may 
be determined by success or failure of Chinese diplomatic and economic integration strategies, 
preferences and priorities of Chinese leadership, ebb and flow of nationalism, and relative 
importance of oil.  
How the PLA would fight a war if all other policies and strategies fail, however, may depend on the 
relative balance of battlefield capabilities. If the PLA is the “superior” power in a conflict against an 
“inferior” opponent, it might deploy strategic-level, exterior-line quick and offensive operations 
(外线的速决进攻战). If the PLA is the “inferior” power fighting a “superior” opponent, however, 
it would likely proceed with elevated caution and a shift to interior-line strategic defense 
(内线战略防御). In this equation, the dominant PLA strategy employed is what is known as 
“movement warfare” (运动战), that is, quick, tactical-level, exterior-line offensive operations within 
the general context of interior-line strategic defense.  
This active defense strategy highlights constant force movements, including giving up places (or 
defensive bastions) to avoid the spearheads of enemy offensives; conducting constant outflanking to 
shift, divide, disperse, and isolate enemy forces and to “cause the enemy to make mistakes;” 
identifying the weaknesses of enemy offensives in movement; “luring enemy in deep;” developing 
local and temporary but also absolutely superior forces (绝对优势兵力) relative to each of these 
weaknesses in movement; and annihilating enemy forces piece by piece in movements 
(在运动中各个歼灭敌人) beginning with the weakest link. Even in a frontal engagement, which is 
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to be avoided if at all possible, the primary tactics employed include deep-thrust (穿插), cut-up 
(分割), outflanking (迂回) and encirclement (包围). 
Constant force movement is essential mainly because it generates elasticity that enhances the 
survival of the PLA against a superior opponent. A bastion defense-type positional war of matching 
attrition, on the other hand, favors the numerically superior side because similar casualties may mean 
only marginal loss for this side but possibly total annihilation of the inferior side. Letting the enemy 
take and defend places or bastions also helps to disperse and isolate enemy forces and gives the 
initiative to the inferior side that can hold its vital forces (有生力量) together and deploy these 
forces more freely and decisively. Moreover, force movements gain time to get familiarized with the 
enemy in order to understand and identify its weaknesses. Achieving local and temporary but 
absolute force superiority also requires force movement. Finally, concentrating absolutely superior 
forces to fight the weakest link of the enemy ensures high probability of victory in these battles. As a 
result, annihilating enemy forces piece by piece in movement, beginning with the weakest link, 
enables the gradual shift of balance of forces on the battlefield that may eventually allow for 
strategic-level offensive, exterior-line operations.  
This active defense strategy may assign research and development priorities to those weapons 
systems that are highly elastic (弹性) to the extent of being able to conduct “deep thrust, cut-up, 
outflanking and encirclement” maneuvers, rather than to those systems that are highly inelastic and 
escalatory, or more appropriate for a frontal war of matching attrition. 
The PLA has also initiated a policy of “informatization” to enhance the effectiveness of its active 
defense strategy. This policy first intends to integrate information technologies (IT) that can 
improve the PLA's survivability, including integrating low-observable design into the new naval and 
air platforms, acquisition of more concealed naval platforms, and enhancing missile defense. China’s 
successful test of a mid-course missile interception on January 11, 2010, test flights of the highly 
stealthy 4th generation combat aircraft J-20 since January 11, 2011, and acquisition of several new 
types of submarines are recent examples.  
Moreover, this policy aims to integrate IT that can “cause the enemy to make mistakes” by triggering 
misjudgments. New capabilities may include anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, cyber-warfare and 
other counter-measures that may reduce the effectiveness of the opponent’s C4ISR (command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). China’s 
successful ASAT test on January 11, 2007 is a recent example. 
Furthermore, this policy intends to integrate IT that can help improve battlefield awareness to 
identify the opponent’s vulnerabilities. The intensified PLA effort in recent years to develop land, 
coast, sea, air and space-based ISR networks represents this development. Finally, this policy intends 
to integrate IT that can assist in integrating forces, and that can enhance precision of strikes. 
 
Concert of powers and Chinese behavior 
Chinese analysts seem to understand that China’s obligations to provide public goods for the global 
community should grow because China’s economic rise is closely related to globalization. China has 
now become the biggest contributor of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping forces among the 
permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council. It has also continuously deployed naval 
escort groups to Gulf of Aden to fight piracy since December 2008. China’s sponsorship of six-
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party talks to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula is arguably China’s major non-proliferation 
initiative. Finally, the PLA Navy’s dedicated hospital ship Peace Ark embarked on a three-month 
voyage of East African and Indian Ocean countries for a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
(HA/DR) mission in 2010.  
These Chinese initiatives are driven partly by a desire to enhance China’s international prestige and 
partly by the practical need to create a stable and peaceful environment for continued economic 
growth at home and for its expanded interests abroad. There are, however, concerns among Chinese 
analysts that these policies, if excessive, may cause over-extension that may hurt Chinese interests. 
One major Chinese reflection on Zheng He’s maritime voyages in the Ming Dynasty, for instance, is 
that these voyages squandered resources by building gigantic ships and spreading wealth to enhance 
imperial prestige but without engaging in profitable trade and acquiring overseas colonies. The 
tributary system that these voyages helped to develop also contributed to imperial decline because 
the lesser states scrambled to become tributary states since the Chinese court would give out more 
expensive gifts than it took in (厚往薄来). These concerns may explain why Chinese policies to do 
international good can be quite limited and they are mainly confined to protecting Chinese interests. 
The counter-piracy mission in Gulf of Aden, for instance, serves mainly to protect Chinese flagged 
ships. The mission of the hospital ship voyage was to provide medical treatment first to Chinese 
military personnel serving in the South China Sea and Gulf of Aden; second to Chinese diplomatic 
personnel serving in the East Africa and Indian Ocean countries; and finally to the locals in these 
countries. Because China suffers from numerous natural disasters every year, the HA/DR missions 
of the PLA are likely to be primarily concentrated on relieving domestic disasters in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
Return of great power confrontations and Chinese behavior 
The two types of Chinese behavior discussed above may all have implications for return of great 
power confrontations. The first type, Chinese behavior in the fragmented East Asian international 
system, does not exhibit the sort of structural and systemic competitions that existed between the 
US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. The territorial disputes that China has had such as over 
Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and Diaoyu/Senkaku pose no direct threat to the security of the US. 
Neither does China’s military doctrine of preparing for fighting and winning a “local war” assume 
the US as the enemy. The small and limited nuclear arsenal that China has deployed so far may attest 
to this assumption. China’s independent, non-alignment foreign policy also forsakes a major military 
alliance such as another Warsaw Pact against the US. Furthermore, US and China cooperate on 
issues of countering international terrorism, energy security, environmental protection, and counter-
nuclear proliferation. The level of economic interdependence between the two countries is also quite 
high.  
On the other hand, some countries and regions that China has quarrels with are US allies whom the 
US has treaty or legal obligations to defend. Also, any assertive Chinese behavior in handling these 
territorial issues may be perceived as China’s attempt to undermine and diminish US power and 
influence in the region. The mutual suspicion and possible miscalculation about each other’s 
intentions and capabilities within the context of perceived power transition may trigger tension and 
even small-scale military conflicts. These may further erode the already limited mutual trust and 
confidence, contributing to precarious conditions that may foster possible great power 
confrontations. 
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The second type, Chinese behavior within the framework of a concert of powers, reflects a dilemma 
that China faces in protecting its expanding overseas interests. Traditionally, China has been 
dependent on US provision of public goods such as sea lanes security. But a major Chinese concern 
is that China may pay a high cost for such dependence in a conflict such as over Taiwan, where the 
US may impose an oil embargo on China. China can try to develop a blue-water navy, but it takes 
time and it may also trigger great power confrontations that could diminish Chinese security. As a 
result, China now takes an indirect and non-confrontational approach, mainly in terms of promoting 
non-traditional security to protect its overseas interests. China is also trying to diversify its sea-borne 
transportation away from choke points such as Strait of Malacca and to develop land-bound energy 
and trade-related transportation routes. To reduce over-dependence on exports, expand domestic 
consumption and achieve more equitable distribution of wealth, the government is also attempting 
to shift investment capital from the wealthy coastal provinces to more backward hinterland 
provinces. 
There are other major constraints on how far China can go to protect its overseas interests. China, 
for instance, has no overseas naval bases. A major reason is that China’s independent, non-
alignment foreign policy forbids China to develop a military alliance relationship with other 
countries, but overseas military bases are usually located in territories of close allies. This makes it 
difficult for Chinese naval ships to gain sustained logistics, maintenance and combat support.  
Related to this policy is China’s approach of “non-interference in internal affairs” (also associated 
with the pre-modern tributary system) of other countries. While this approach may enable China to 
avoid entanglement in regional and domestic conflicts of other countries, it also means that China 
may have minimal influence on domestic development of these countries. This lack of domestic 
influence may in turn incur heavy economic losses to China in times of domestic chaos and anarchy, 
as has happened to Chinese investment recently in Libya. Similarly, Chinese military doctrine is 
about fighting and winning “local war” on the margins of China. This makes it difficult to justify and 
normalize out-of-region military deployment to protect Chinese overseas interests. Moreover, the 
PLA Navy is quite weak in its anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which in turn would expose 
Chinese naval ships deployed overseas to submarine threats. 
There are, however, heated debates among China’s foreign policy elites on issues such as 
establishing overseas military bases, maintaining the non-alignment and non-interference foreign 
policies, and developing the “local war” doctrine. Such debates have resulted in some subtle changes 
to Chinese policy behavior. China, for instance, has recently begun to cultivate relations with 
political oppositions in countries such as Libya and Sudan, which represents an important departure 
from its policy of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. The outcome of these debates 
is crucially important because they may constitute major indicators on whether China intends to 
become a global superpower, which may have major implications for great power competitions if 
not direct confrontations.  
 
Rise of non-state networks and Chinese behavior 
Numerous small-scale protests/riots every year and ethnic unrests in Tibet and Xinjiang constitute 
major domestic challenges to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule in China. The causes of 
these incidents are complex, ranging from unfair compensation, and poor working conditions, to 
environmental and safety-related issues, abuses of power by local officials such as land grabs, 
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regional and ethnic discrimination, and the spread of the internet and proliferation of sensational 
media.  
In a country of 1.3 billion people experiencing rapid economic and social changes, occurrence of 
these so-called “mass incidents” may not be totally abnormal. A major indicator of whether these 
incidents may represent the rise of politically motivated non-state networks is whether they evolve 
into nationally organized oppositions that directly challenge the party rule. Another major indicator 
of whether governance collapses in China and whether major civil conflicts prevail due to the rise of 
these networks is whether the PLA is mobilized to defend the party against these domestic political 
oppositions.  
On both counts, however, trends seem to favor the government rather than the non-state networks. 
For instance, these protests have so far stayed relatively localized, disconnected to each other, and 
confined to economic and other practical grievances and demands rather than political ones. Also, 
instead of being mobilized to protect the party against domestic political oppositions, the PLA has 
been largely confined to its functional, technical and external missions for more than 20 years since 
1989. Lessons learned from the 1989 Tian’anmen incident and the collapse of communism in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991 by China’s governing elites may 
account for these trends. 
One major lesson learned from the events during 1989-1991 is that the CCP’s dependence on 
military force in Tian’anmen for survival indicates the failure of the party-state to resolve major 
social-economic crises and implies its lack of ability to manage social protests other than through the 
use of such lethal means as tanks and sub-machine guns. This had contributed to a decline in the 
CCP’s legitimacy to rule. Also, there are indicators that the PLA was reluctant to get involved in the 
suppression of the rebellion mainly because its image would be damaged. Even for Deng Xiaoping, 
the task of persuading the PLA to intervene had been far from easy, and he had to exhaust much of 
his political capital to accomplish this.  
More recent leaders such as Jiang Zemin do not possess the kind of revolutionary and military 
credentials that Deng did. So new leaders are not confident that the military would take their side if 
ordered to intervene in another crisis on the scale of Tian’anmen. The popular revolts that ended 
communist rule in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe show that rather than taking the 
party’s side, the military mostly defied its orders. This means the party’s reliance on military force for 
its survival may not necessarily guarantee success, but may quicken the demise of the party rule 
instead.  
These concerns may explain why Jiang replaced the post-1989 policy of military control and 
ideological indoctrination with a new policy of promoting economic growth at the 14th CCP 
Congress of 1992, a policy also associated with Deng’s southern tour in early 1992. Such a policy 
was intended to enhance the CCP’s legitimacy to rule by increasing income and improving living 
standards, and providing employment opportunities for millions of people who join the labor force 
every year. It also helped to generate revenue for preventing and preempting social crises. By 2011, 
for instance, China’s public (domestic) security outlays of $95.0 billion overtook its official defense 
budget of $91.5 billion for the first time. 
Strategies have been developed to manage social protests stemming from the downsides of rapid 
economic growth, such as massive urban unemployment due to reform of state-owned enterprises, 
over-taxation of the peasants, rampant corruption, wealth polarization and environmental 
degradation. They range from soft approaches such as co-opting protesters by meeting their 
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demands and improving institutions for monitoring, expressing and resolving grievances before they 
escalate, to hard ones such as arresting politically conscious organizers, and isolating and containing 
such protests to prevent them from evolving into larger, better organized movements that directly 
challenge the CCP's rule.  
Similarly, the People’s Armed Police, which is primarily responsible for maintaining domestic social 
stability, has been substantially strengthened, and riot control units with non-lethal means such as 
tear gas and rubber bullets were developed and deployed. All these have reduced the need to 
mobilize the PLA against domestic political oppositions. They in turn made it possible to confine 
the PLA to the narrower functional, technical and external missions.  
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